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CASENOTES
IS THE DEBTOR LEFT "STANDING" WHEN THE MUSIC
STOPS: ASSUMPTION AND REJECTION OF
EXECUTORY RECORDING CONTRACTS
BY INSOLVENT MUSICIANS
I. INTRODUCTION
The music industry is built on intangibles: hope, dreams, talent,
drive and a predictive ability by recording company executives to accu-
rately gauge the future direction of the public's taste in music. The in-
dustry is not based solely on mystic speculation however. Record
companies need large amounts of money to finance the concrete aspects
of the business, which include signing new bands, producing records and
promoting performers to the record-buying public. When a business is
built on this volatile mix of nebulous elements and the corporate bottom-
line, the parties involved necessarily take many financial risks. Indeed,
the statistics show that it is more likely that a young band will be a finan-
cial liability to the recording company, rather than a commercial suc-
cess.' As a result, the recording industry generally invests in unknown
talent with the hope that one artist out of ten may generate profits.2 The
need to spend a great deal of money up front before any success can be
measured, and the probability that a band will financially fail, are risks
inherent in the music industry that record companies have acknowledged
and compensated for in their business practices.
Since the 1982 New York federal court decision of Matter of Noo-
nan, 4 record companies have faced an additional risk. The Noonan court
held that musicians under exclusive recording agreements with record
companies could terminate these personal services contracts in bank-
1. Julis & Baez, Bankruptcy: The Death of Recording Contracts, 2 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 189, 207 n.89 (Spring 1982). According to the authors, about 70-80% of the albums
recorded fail to break even. Id.
2. Id.
3. Declaration of Miles Copeland in Support of Ex Parte Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction at 3, Interna-
tional Record Syndicate, Inc. v. Mankey, Ch. 7 Case No. LA 87-18211-GM (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Declaration of Copeland].
4. 17 Bankr. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd men, 697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ruptcy.' This decision, reached by a loose interpretation of Bankruptcy
Code section 365,6 has given performers a potent tool to use against re-
cording companies.7 The threat of a performer's bankruptcy could force
the record company into renegotiation of the recording agreement, or if
renegotiation fails, the performer can break the contract by rejecting it8
in the bankruptcy.
The decision also has meant that the discharged contracts are no
longer effective between the parties, and thus record companies are left
without a remedy for the performers' contractual breach upon bank-
ruptcy. Under the terms of most recording agreements, the company
reserves the right to seek a negative injunction 9 to prevent the performer
from recording or performing for another company. However, in the
face of a discharged recording agreement, the contractual remedy of a
negative injunction is useless because it is unenforceable. Hence, record
companies have been forced to absorb not only the marketplace risks that
5. Id. at 799.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1987). Section 365 states in relevant part:
(d)(1): In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject
an executory contract... within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such
additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such
contract... is deemed rejected.
Id.
The Code does not define what types of contracts are executory. However, the term exec-
utory generally refers to contracts on which some performance remains due on both sides. See
generally Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439 (1973).
7. Declaration of Michael O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction at 13, Interna-
tional Record Syndicate, Inc. v. Mankey, Ch. 7 Case No. LA 87-18211-GM (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Declaration of O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application].
8. Julis & Baez, supra note 1, at 189.
9. 38 Cal. Jur. 3d Injunctions §§ 1, 2 (1977). Section 1 states:
An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act or
to do a particular act. A restrictive injunction is a form of preventive relief usually
referred to as a prohibitory injunction, whereas an injunction requiring affirmative
action is a form of specific relief commonly designated a mandatory injunction.
Section 2 states:
An injunction is a remedy, not a cause of action, and will not be granted if no cause
of action exists. An action for an injunction is an equitable proceeding and must be
based on equitable circumstances. The remedy is available generally for the protec-
tion of legal rights, its purpose being to prevent threatened action and its office being
to restrain a wrongdoer, not to punish him. It is summary, peculiar, and extraordi-
nary, and should not be granted in a doubtful case. The right to an injunction should
be clear, and should be based on a showing of impending or threatened injury that
can be averted only by the injunctive process. It will not issue to enforce a right or
prevent a wrong in the abstract, nor will it be issued where it will retard justice or
where it can be of no conceivable benefit to the plaintiff and would thus be useless.
The remedy is in personam, and lies for the protection of rights, not to enable the
perpetration of wrongs.
1989] BANKRUPTCY
a performer will not become successful, but also to absorb the further
risk that a performer may be able to walk away from his or her recording
agreement by filing for bankruptcy.
The court in In re James Andrew Mankey,'O however, eliminated
any chance that a musician could manipulate the bankruptcy process for
personal gain by reaching a conclusion contrary to Noonan. In Mankey
the court interpreted the language of section 365 literally." The court
held that an executory personal services contract does not fall within the
provisions of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code at all.' 2 Thus, the ex-
clusive recording agreements, which are personal services contracts be-
tween the performer-debtors and the record company, could not be
rejected in bankruptcy court. 13 The Mankey court held that the record-
ing agreement remained in effect' 4 even after the debtors received their
individual bankruptcy discharges' 5 from the remainder of their debts.
While record companies will be pleased by the Mankey decision be-
cause it extends the control the companies wield over performers, 16 the
Mankey court may have struck a grave blow, and in fact contravened,
the "fresh start" policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code. The policy be-
hind the Bankruptcy Code is to give the honest but unfortunate debtor a
right of discharge' 7 from his debts in order to provide the debtor with a
10. Ch. 7 Case No. LA 87-1821 1-GM, slip op. at 5-6 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1987)
[hereinafter Mankey ].
11. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5-6. The Mankey court stated in its slip opinion that "[t]he
Court's opinion in In re [Tia] Carrere... is consistent with this case." Id. The Mankey court
fully adopted its reasoning from Carrere. Subsequent citations to the Mankey slip opinion will
be followed by a citation to Carrere where the court explains its reasoning. See In re Tia
Carrere, 64 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
12. Mankey, supra note 10, at 6.
13. Id
14. Id.
15. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 524.01 (15th ed. 1979). Section 524(a)(1) states that a
discharge voids any judgment obtained against the debtor at any time to the extent that the
judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor. Judgments of this type are
avoided even if the debtor has waived his right to discharge the particular debt involved. In
addition, § 524(a)(2) specifies that a discharge granted to the debtor under §§ 727, 944, 1141,
1228 or 1328, operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an ac-
tion, the employment of process, or an act, including telephone calls, letters and personal
contacts to collect, recover or offset any discharged debt as a personal liability to the debtor.
Id.
16. Unknown entertainers have limited bargaining power with the record company. All
that young artists have to offer is burgeoning but untested talent and enthusiasm. As a result,
they often lock themselves into long-term contracts. Julis & Baez, supra note 1, at 189. See
also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (Deering 1976).
17. 3 COLLIER, supra note 15. There is one exception to the general rule that the debtor's
post-petition property is protected from pre-petition claims of creditors. Under § 542(a)(3), a
creditor can attack a debtor's post-petition property under § 541(a)(6). Post-petition property
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new financial future. '8
As a result of the court's decision in Mankey the members of the
band Concrete Blonde emerged from bankruptcy with their executory' 9
personal services 2' contracts still intact. So long as recording agreements
are held to be nonrejectable in bankruptcy proceedings, 2' performer-
debtors will be unable to experience the vaunted "fresh start" that the
Bankruptcy Code promises to all honest debtors who file in good faith.22
includes proceeds, products, offspring, rents and profits which are derived mainly from prepe-
tition property of the estate and which can be reached by creditors.
One way the discharge concept has been given practical effect is by Congress' broad defi-
nition of the term "claim." In I I U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) and (B), all types of claims which can be
reduced to a monetary value are included. This enables all claims against the bankrupt to be
valued, paid off according to the rules of bankruptcy and then discharged to free the debtor. If
a claim cannot be reduced to a "right of payment" it is not dischargeable, and to the extent
that the claim is nondischargeable, the debtor's "fresh start" is impaired. See generally I 
U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, 101 (1987).
18. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
19. Countryman, supra note 6, at 460. Professor Countryman defines executory contracts
as "a contract under which the obligations of both a bankrupt and the other party to the
contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would con-
stitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Id. Additionally, Professor
Williston has suggested that "[a]ll contracts to a greater or less extent are executory. When
they cease to be so, they cease to be contracts." I S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 14 (3d ed.
1957).
20. 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.22[3] (14th ed. 1979). "A personal services con-
tract is a contract which is based upon personal skills, or upon personal trust or confidence.
Whether a contract involves personal skill, trust or confidence depends upon the subject of the
contract, the circumstances of the case, and the intent of the parties." Id
21. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5.
22. In the context of determining the rejectability of executory personal services contracts,
the bankruptcy courts have bypassed the issue of good faith at the filing stage. Instead, judges
are seeking a satisfactory way to handle these contracts on a regular basis. Hence, this case-
note will not deal with the issue of whether the debtor-performers' contract should have been
dismissed for lack of good faith.
The framers of the Bankruptcy Code did not explicitly address the issue of good faith
filings in Chapter 7 proceedings. Historically, courts have held that judicial interpretation
incorporates a standard of good faith for the commencement, prosecution and confirmation of
bankruptcy proceedings. Matter of Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir.
1986). See also In re Victory Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 551-60 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981)
(containing an excellent historical survey of good faith requirements in bankruptcy).
Courts have recognized that a good faith filing standard is effective in preventing abuse or
distortion of reorganization or rehabilitation provisions of bankruptcy law. However, concern
that creditors will be delayed or a debtor will be able to achieve reprehensible purposes is not
as compelling in a Chapter 7 liquidation case as it is in a Chapter 11 reorganization. Little
Creek 779 F.2d 1068, 1071. While courts have the common law power to dismiss Chapter 7
cases if not filed in good faith, the Code does not "explicitly authorize" the court to dismiss a
petition even if filed in bad faith. In re Southern California Sound Systems, Inc., 69 Bankr.
893, 899 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
There may be at least two rationales for the more flexible Chapter 7 good faith standard.
First, even if a debtor is only in the early stages of financial failure, his creditors will get paid
[Vol. 9
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II. IN RE JAMES ANDREW MANKEY. THE FACTS
James Andrew Mankey, Harry Everette Rushakoff and Johnette
Napolitano compose the talented Los Angeles-based rock band known as
Concrete Blonde. On December 5, 1986, the group entered into three
agreements with International Record Syndicate, Inc. ("I.R.S."). The
parties signed a production agreement, an exclusive songwriting agree-
ment,23 and a co-publishing agreement.24 The agreements25 bound the
group for an initial one-year term during which Concrete Blonde was
required to complete and deliver to I.R.S. one long-playing record al-
bum.26 Under the terms of the contract, I.R.S. had the option to renew
its exclusive contract with Concrete Blonde for successive one-year peri-
ods, up to a maximum term of seven contract periods; 2" and I.R.S. obli-
gated itself to fully fund Concrete Blonde in all phases of album
production during each term.28
The company met all its obligations in the first contract period29 and
spent more than $17,500 to groom and prepare the neophyte band and to
promote the release of the band's debut album3 ° entitled Concrete
Blonde.3 I.R.S. spent $125,000 for an all-encompassing promotional
campaign for the debut album. The campaign included planning single
releases, producing music videos, and putting together the band's first
something sooner rather than later when there are even fewer assets for the bankruptcy estate;
and second, if the debtor willingly chooses to relinquish all of his personal property except for
exempt property, he should be allowed to do so.
23. Declaration of O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application, supra note 7, at 3.
The production agreement and the exclusive songwriting agreement are personal services
contracts which may only be performed by the band members. The agreements expressly
prohibit the band members from providing their songwriting or recording services to any other
party during the term; or from entering into any agreement which could interfere or cause
interference with the band's performance of the agreements. The exclusive songwriting agree-
ment provides for each of the band members to furnish the record company with his or her
exclusive songwriting services during the term of the production agreement. Ownership of all
compositions written during the term, including the copyrights to the works, vest in the re-
cording company. Id.
24. Id. Under the co-publishing agreement all recordings produced by the band, or any of
the band members during the term are, and become, sole and exclusive property of the record
company from the inception of the recording. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (Deering 1976).
28. Mankey, supra note 10, at 4.
29. Id.
30. Declaration of O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application, supra note 7, at 6.
31. Motion of I.R.S. Records for an Order Dismissing Chapter 7 Case or, in the alterna-
tive, Providing that an Executory Contract for Personal Services is Excluded from the Opera-
tion of 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and (d)(l) at 4, International Record Syndicate, Inc. v. Mankey,
Ch. 7 Case No. LA 87-18211-GM (1987) [hereinafter Motion of I.R.S. for Dismissal].
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tour.32 In addition, I.R.S. gave the band an additional $13,488 to insure
that the band members maintained an adequate standard of living33
while waiting to see how the debut album fared.
Concrete Blonde released its debut album on December 29, 1986. 34
Both the band and the album generated much critical acclaim, and the
album sold approximately 90,000 copies worldwide.35 By April, 1987,
Concrete Blonde cracked the "Top 100" and soon spawned three popular
videos. Later that year, ROLLING STONE magazine profiled the band.
36
Though the record had limited sales, the volume of sales indicated to
I.R.S. executives that Concrete Blonde was a promising act with a bright
future.3 7 Pleased with the band's initial performance, I.R.S. exercised its
first option38 and renewed all of the agreements between Concrete
Blonde and I.R.S. for a second year. Under the renewed agreements the
recording company paid out at least $23,000 towards the creation of the
band's second album. This amount was exclusive of monies paid directly
to the band members for living expenses.39
Within minutes of each other on September 4, 1987, each member of
Concrete Blonde filed separate voluntary petitions' in bankruptcy under
Chapter 7.41 In each petition the performer-debtor's schedule listed only
three substantial creditors: the band's general and bankruptcy counsel,
the band's accountant and the band's manager. 42 Each band member
listed identical income and expense figures, and all three members of
Concrete Blonde failed to include in their petitions a statement of execu-
tory contracts or unexpired leases that each held as required by Bank-
32. Declaration of O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application, supra note 7, at 5.
33. Motion of I.R.S. for Dismissal, supra note 31, at 5.
34. Declaration of O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application, supra note 7, at 5.
35. Id.
36. Id at Exhibit G.
37. Declaration of Michael O'Brien in Support of I.R.S. Records' Motion for an Order
Dismissing Chapter 7 Case or, in the alternative, Providing that an Executory Contract for
Personal Services is Excluded from the Operation of 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and (d)(l) at 2, In re
James Andrew Mankey, Ch. 7 Case No. LA 87-1821 1-GM (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) [hereinaf-
ter O'Brien in Support of Dismissal].
38. Id.
39. O'Brien in Support of Dismissal, supra note 37, at 2.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1987). This section governs the manner in which a voluntary bank-
ruptcy is commenced. The debtor may file under Chapter 11 for corporate reorganization;
under Chapter 13 for an individual reorganization; or under Chapter 7 for liquidation.
In a liquidation, the debtor turns over all nonexempt property which is sold and the
money is used to repay creditors. In exchange, the debtor is no longer personally liable for any
unpaid debts which arose before he filed for bankruptcy. The filing of the petition constitutes
an order for relief in the case under that chapter. Id.
41. Motion of I.R.S. for Dismissal, supra note 31, at 5.
42. Id.
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ruptcy Rule 1007(b)(1). 43 The statements of affairs" attached to the
performer-debtors' petitions seemed to suggest that the band members
were not in a distressed financial situation.45
Each performer-debtor admitted in his or her petition that he or she
was filing for bankruptcy in an attempt to reject the group's agreements
with I.R.S." Concrete Blonde's intentions to reject the contracts were
very clear. The president of I.R.S. stated that, "[s]ince the members of
Concrete Blonde filed bankruptcy, the word 'on the street' . . has been
that Concrete Blonde is free of its contractual commitments to I.R.S. and
is 'on the market' and that signing with another label is imminent.
'47
Furthermore, on September 22, 1987, eighteen days after filing for bank-
ruptcy, Concrete Blonde performed in a "showcase" presentation at the
Roxy Theater in West Hollywood. Representatives of the major record
labels including A&M Records, Capitol Records and Geffen Records at-
tended. Concrete Blonde performed in the showcase to publicize its de-
sire to sign with a different label.4"
I.R.S. filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to dismiss the band
members' bankruptcy petitions on the grounds that the petitions were
filed in bad faith.49 Alternatively, the record company argued that a con-
tract for personal services was excluded from the operation of 11 U.S.C.
section 365 because personal services contracts do not become part of the
bankruptcy estate, and thus the band members could not reject the
agreements. 50
On the basis that the agreements were determined nondischargeable,
I.R.S. argued that the court should grant the record company its con-
tractual remedy and enjoin Concrete Blonde from performing or record-
ing for any other record company.5 I.R.S. argued that a denial of the
injunction would injure the company's distribution relationship with
MCA Records.52 Denial of the injunction would also mean that I.R.S.
43. Mankey, supra note 10, at 4. See generally Bankruptcy Rule § 1007(b)(1).
44. The Statement of Financial Affairs for Debtor Engaged in Business is a comprehensive
official form. It is required by Bankruptcy Rule § 1007(b)(1). The court, however, can waive
the statement requirement.
45. Motion of I.R.S. for Dismissal, supra note 31, at 5-6. "Evidence of collection efforts,
defaults, or repossessions of band member debts of property is noticeably absent from the
petitions." Id.
46. Mankey, supra note 10, at 4.
47. Declaration of Copeland, supra note 3, at 1.
48. O'Brien in Support of Dismissal, supra note 37, at 3-4.
49. Motion of I.R.S. for Dismissal, supra note 31, at 6-7.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Declaration of O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application, supra note 7, at 12.
52. Id. at 13.
1989]
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would not receive the benefit of its bargain under the agreements, which
was the exclusive right to market and distribute the works and songs of
the group.53 Finally, I.R.S. feared that if the other recording groups
signed to its label learned that I.R.S. was powerless to prevent Concrete
Blonde from rejecting its contract, the company would be in peril.54
I.R.S. feared that its other artists would follow Concrete Blonde's exam-
ple: perform under their agreements until they reached the "initial pin-
nacle of success," then terminate their contracts by filing for bankruptcy
in order to obtain more attractive contracts with other companies.55
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The bankruptcy court in Mankey concluded that Concrete Blonde's
executory personal services contract survived each performer's discharge
in bankruptcy.56 To determine whether Concrete Blonde's recording
agreement with I.R.S. could be rejected in bankruptcy, the court relied
upon the reasoning in In re Tia Carrere.17 Following its own precedent,
the Mankey court analyzed section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.58 The
Mankey court stated that section 365 gives the trustee power to assume
or assign executory contracts which he determines are advantageous to
the estate and to reject contracts which he believes are not lucrative or
beneficial.59
The court found that the trustee's rejection powers under section
365 are only effective if he has actual rights and duties in the executory
contract at issue. Before the trustee could reject Concrete Blonde's con-
53. Motion of I.R.S. for Dismissal, supra note 31, at 11.
54. Declaration of O'Brien in Support of Ex Parte Application, supra note 7, at 12-13.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5.
57. 64 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). Tia Carrere was an actress who had entered
into a three year personal services contract with American Broadcasting Company ("ABC"),
in which she was guaranteed weekly appearances on the network's daytime television soap
opera, "General Hospital." Eight months after she began appearing on the show, Tia Carrere
filed for bankruptcy with the primary motivation of rejecting the contract with ABC. Carrere
apparently expected to be hired as a regular cast member on the night-time television show
"The A-Team" after she had appeared on that show in a supporting role. The court held that
Carrere could not reject the ABC contract. Id. at 160.
58. Monkey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 157.
59. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5-6. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158.
[I]f the trustee assumes the contract, the trustee is obligated to perform in place of
the debtor, and the nonbankrupt party remains obligated to perform. If the trustee
fails to perform after assumption, then the non-bankrupt party receives a first prior-
ity administrative claim of the estate. A debtor-in-possession has the same rights and
powers as the trustee. Those rights are outlined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1987).
Zaretsky, Personal Contracts, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 1, ol. 1. For a discussion of how a
trustee assumes an executory contract see infra note 84. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1987).
[Vol. 9
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tract with I.R.S., the court determined that it had to address the thresh-
old issue of whether the executory personal services contract entered into
the bankruptcy estate at all.'
The court pointed out that section 541(a)6 ' exemplifies the expansive
reach of the Bankruptcy Code intended by Congress.62 Congress deter-
mined that the bankruptcy estate is comprised of all legal and equitable
interests in property that belong to the debtor on the date he or she files a
petition in bankruptcy. 63 Furthermore, as the court noted, Congress in-
tended that all of the debtor's property becomes part of the estate unless
Code provisions specifically exclude the property, or allow the debtor to
exempt the property. 64 By broadly defining "property of the estate,"
Congress insured that most of the debtor's assets were available for dis-
tribution to the creditors in repayment of their debts.65
To determine if property was excluded from the bankruptcy estates
of the band members, the court looked to section 541(a)(6). 66 This provi-
sion excludes "earnings from services performed by an individual debtor
after the commencement of the case" from the bankruptcy estate.67 The
court concluded that post-petition earnings were not assets to which
creditors could look for repayment.68
The court also concluded that the 1979 congressional expansion of
the types of property that entered the bankruptcy estate did not alter the
common law concept that personal services contracts remained outside
the estate, and also were not available to satisfy creditors' claims.6 9 The
court found that section 541(a)(6) was a codification of prior cases hold-
ing that "[w]here an executory contract between the debtor and another
is based on personal service or skill of the debtor, the trustee does not
take title to the bankrupt's rights in the contract."' 7° The court reasoned
60. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1987).
62. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158.
63. Id.
64. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1987). Both tangible and
intangible property is included in the bankruptcy estate. This includes causes of action and all
property recovered by the trustee under § 542. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1987).
65. "[M]ost of bankruptcy law is concerned ... with providing a compulsory and collec-
tive system for satisfying the claims of creditors." Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bank-
ruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (1985).
66. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1987).
68. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158. See also Matter of Noo-
nan, 17 Bankr. 793, 798 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982).
69. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158.
70. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Holahan, 311 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1962) (see 4A COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 70.22 (14th ed. 1978)).
1989]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
that because the personal services contract is excluded from the estate,
the trustee has no interest in that contract.71
The court next addressed the issue of whether the trustee's general
powers still enable him to reject the executory contract.72 The court held
that because the trustee has no interest in the contract, he has no stand-
ing to dispose of the executory personal services contract under section
365. 7' Therefore, absence of a legal interest in the contract prevents the
trustee from assuming or rejecting the personal services recording
agreement.
The court then considered whether the performers possessed the re-
quired standing to dispose of the recording agreement in the bankruptcy
proceeding.74 The court noted that the unusual nature of the personal
services contract meant that the performer-debtors were the only parties
in the bankruptcy proceeding who had rights and duties under the re-
cording agreement.75 The court determined, however, that the debtors
were unable to act on the contract because the language of section
365(d)(1) provides that only the trustee has the power to reject an execu-
tory contract.76 Thus, the statute precludes a debtor from rejecting the
contract on his or her own.77
The Mankey court, therefore, concluded that an executory personal
services contract is beyond the reach of the trustee's powers because the
trustee cannot have any interest in a personal services contract.7 ' Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that the debtors lacked the requisite stand-
ing to reject the contract under the Code. 79 Thus, an executory personal
services contract passes through bankruptcy unaffected.
IV. ARTICLE OVERVIEW
Mankey and Matter of Noonan arrived at contrary results concern-
ing the rejectability of executory personal services contracts in bank-
ruptcy. These decisions come from California and New York, the two
71. Mankey, supra note 10, at 6. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158 n.2. The right of the
trustee or the debtor-in-possession to possess and control property is created by the Bank-
ruptcy Code. It grants standing to deal with "property of the estate." There is no right given
to a trustee or a debtor-in-possession to take control of property which is not property of the
estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(1), 1106, 1107 (1987).
72. Mankey, supra note 10, at 6. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 158.
73. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 159.
74. Mankey, supra note 10, at 6. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 157-58.
75. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 159.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1987).
77. Mankey, supra note 10, at 6. See Carrere, 64 Bankr. at 159.
78. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5.
79. Id.
[Vol. 9
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states where most of the record industry is located.8 ° The dichotomy of
the holdings threatens to make an unstable industry even shakier, and
also illuminates the absence in the Bankruptcy Code of appropriate
guidelines for dealing with the issue. Until Congress intervenes, uncer-
tainty will persist about the post-bankruptcy relationship between re-
cording artists and record companies. Without a statutory amendment,
cases on this issue will turn solely on whether a court gives more weight
to the executory nature of the contract and deems the contract rejectable
by the trustee under section 365; or whether the court gives more weight
to the unique personal services aspect of the agreement and excludes the
contract from the bankruptcy estate.
If the court finds the contracts rejectable, the court must further
determine which party to the bankruptcy, the trustee or the debtor, pos-
sesses the requisite standing8 to determine the fate of the contract. The
Mankey court held the contract to be nonrejectable because it gave
greater weight to the personal services aspect of the executory agreement
and therefore prohibited the contract from entering the bankruptcy es-
tate. 2 By its findings, the court necessarily determined that no party to
the bankruptcy process, neither trustee, nor the performer-debtors, had
the requisite standing to dispose of the exclusive recording agreements.
8 3
Since the framers of the Bankruptcy Code dealt specifically with the
trustee's powers to assume, 84 assign" and reject 86 general executory con-
tracts in section 365, it seems anomalous that Congress left the disposi-
80. D. BIEDERMAN, R. BIERRY, E. PIERSON, M. SILFERN, J. GLASS, LAW AND BUSINESS
OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 2 (1987) [hereinafter BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BusI-
NESS]. Most entertainment contracts negotiated today are entered into and performed in Cali-
fornia and New York. "Because the entertainment industries are so firmly entrenched in those
states, extensive regulations of the entertainment industries exist in those jurisdictions." Id.
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260-61 (5th ed. 1979). BLACK'S defines "standing" in
pertinent part:
Standing to sue means that a party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution.... The requirement of "standing" is satis-
fied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectable and tangible interest at
stake in the litigation. Standing... focuses on the question of whether the litigant is
the proper party to fight the lawsuit....
Id.
82. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5.
83. Id. at 6.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1987). The policy behind § 365 is that executory contracts and
unexpired leases should be freely assignable to allow the bankruptcy estate to benefit from the
incremental value which will be derived from performance of the contract. Free assignability
permits the estate to replace marginal business arrangements with profitable business arrange-
ments. The trustee or debtor-in-possession must take specific steps in order to assume the
executory contract. If the debtor defaulted on the contract, the trustee must (A) cure the
default and (B) give adequate assurances of future compensation or immediately compensate
for any pecuniary losses suffered by the nonbankrupt contracting party. However, if the
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tion of a subgroup of executory contracts, personal services contracts,
solely to judicial discretion. Additionally, the nature and complexity of
the recording industry makes the issue of rejecting personal services con-
tracts a thorny one. There is a tension between the needs and desires of
the record company and those of the performer or band."' These ten-
sions emerge from the history of the business, the current practices and
the nature of the relationship between artist and company.
A. A Brief History of the Recording Industry
At the turn of the century the record industry began to develop with
a magnitude and complexity not even Thomas Edison could have fore-
seen."8 The advent of radio in the 1920s and the invention of television in
the 1940s tempered the growth of the sound recording industry. How-
ever, by 1950 United States record sales were approximately $189 million
per year. 9 By 1985 that figure was up to $4.4 billion based on yearly
sales of 653 million units sold domestically.90 From the 1950s until 1978,
the industry grew tremendously.9 But in 1978, the record industry
found itself competing in the marketplace for the consumer's entertain-
ment dollars. The fierce competition was created by the advent of video
games and the increasing demand for home entertainment in the form of
debtor's only default on the contract is the bankruptcy filing, § 365(b)(2) states that the trustee
(or debtor-in-possession) need not give the other party adequate assurances. Id
85. Id. The trustee can assign the contract to another party for completion if the trustee
has properly assumed the contract under § 365(b)(1) and (b)(2) and gives the nondebtor con-
tracting party adequate assurances of future performance by the assignee. The assignee must
be assured that he or she will receive the benefit of the contract bargain.
86. Id. In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee has 60 days to assume the contract, other-
wise it is automatically rejected. There is no comparable time limit under Chapter 11. The
trustee can reject the contract if, in his business judgment, assumption of the contract will not
benefit the estate. Id.
87. Declaration of Copeland, supra note 3, at 3.
In recognition of the realities of the industry, the typical artist's agreement provides
for a lengthy relationship, with royalties to the artist that escalate as more recordings
are sold, and with non-returnable advances against such royalties escalating as the
term of the agreement goes on. These advances are only recoverable by the recording
company from royalties. The typical agreement also leaves the recording company
with the costs of production of recordings. In short, the record company invests its
money, without asking the artist to share that risk or bear the cost of its efforts, while
the artist invests his or her time and talent. Both share in success when and if it
comes. But in order for the recording company to share in that success, and to
recover its initial up-front investment in production and promotion, it must be as-
sured of the exclusive and long-term services of the artist.
Id.
88. BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BusiNEss, supra note 80, at 203.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
BANKRUPTCY
cable television and videocassettes.92 The resulting recession which hit
the record industry affected both sales and profits and lasted until 1984.9"
Mega-selling hits from superstar vocalists such as Michael Jackson,
Bruce Springsteen and Prince led the industry back to brighter times, 94
but the recession forced record companies to rethink their business meth-
ods.95 The record companies, worried about being able to reach a break
even point on record sales for each album, began focusing on signing
previously tested and already profitable talent.96 As a result, unknown
singers or groups have had fewer opportunities in the past few years to
break into the field and obtain a contract from a major recording label.97
In fact, simply having any kind of recording agreement is considered a
major achievement for a band.98
B. The Contractual Arrangement Between the Parties
The business of making records is complicated. Before the perform-
ers begin to work on an album, several contractual agreements are signed
by both band and record company.99 Collectively, the agreements com-
prise what is commonly known as the exclusive recording agreement.
The record company typically signs the artist or band to a long-term
exclusive recording agreement that has a short initial term, usually one
year, with a series of options exercisable by the company to extend the
term of the agreement."°° Recording agreements are almost always "ex-
clusive."' 0 ' The performer is bound by the terms of the agreement to
record and perform solely for the particular company until the record
92. Id.
93. BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BUSINESS, supra note 80, at 203.
94. Id.
95. Id. at xiv.
96. Id. at 205. An album produced by a major record company must sell approximately
250,000 copies in order for the company to reach the break-even point. The distinction be-
tween a distributed record and a sold record is very important because it affects how
recoupable costs are determined. Usually, record retailers and wholesalers have an arrange-
ment which allows the retailer to return some, if not all, of the unsold records of a group. The
potential "returned" record problem creates serious concern in contracts between retailer and
record wholesaler, and between record company and artist. Id. at 206.
97. Id at xiv.
98. Declaration of Copeland, supra note 3, at 4.
99. BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BUSINESS, supra note 80, at 1. "Entertainment is a docu-
ment-intensive business." Id.
100. Id. at 207.
101. Id. Exceptions to the general rule of exclusivity can be drafted into the recording
contract. These exceptions include "work as a 'sideman' for another artist's recording session
and performances on [movie] soundtrack records." Id. The typical recording agreement usu-
ally also includes the additional exclusive provision called the "rerecording restriction." This
provision restricts the artists from rerecording compositions recorded during the term of the
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company decides not to renew an option, or until the record company
has exercised all of its contractual options. In the standard recording
agreement, the band must deliver one long-playing record album in each
contract period, 102 and the recording company must provide the capital,
in the form of advances. 103 The advances are paid directly to the band
for living expenses and to cover album production costs."°
This multi-option arrangement appears to give the record company
flexibility. However, the renewable contract fails to minimize the risks
the company faces each time a band or individual performer is signed.
The various advances usually are recoupable only against the artist's or
band's royalties." ' If the record company chooses not to renew the
agreement, advances expended on the band are never recoupable. It
makes better business sense for a record company to renew its options
than to release a band when success for the group may be just around the
corner.
On the other hand, if a band has received critical acclaim but the
group's first and second albums have not generated a high number of
sales, the band may believe it is getting deeper into debt to the record
company. Even if a subsequent album makes a large profit, the band
may see very little of the money because the record company is first re-
paid all advances it is owed. Furthermore, as each new album is re-
corded under the same contract, the band finds itself locked into a low
contract rate with escalation rates it finds insufficient. 10 6 The record
company must hold onto the band to recoup its investment while the
artists want to move on to earn greater profits once the group has gained
some measure of fame.
The California legislature has acknowledged the competing interests
between artist and company. Recognizing that a fruitful creative rela-
tionship takes time to develop, the legislature decided to give companies
up to seven years in which to make that relationship profitable.1"7 The
agreement for a period of three to five years after the artist has signed with another record
company. Id.
102. Declaration of Copeland in Support of Ex Parte Application, supra note 3, at 3.
103. BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BUSINESS, supra note 80, at 207.
104. Id.
105. Id Royalties are usually based on the percentage of the total wholesale or retail
amounts of the artist's records sold. Id.
106. Id. Escalation clauses increase the royalties that the band realizes each time an option
is exercised. In virtually all recording agreements, the record royalties escalate both on subse-
quent records of the artist and on a sales threshold. Id.
107. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (Deering 1976). This section states in pertinent part: "A
contract to render personal service ... may not be enforced against the employee beyond seven
years from the commencement of service under it." Id.
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main focus of the legislation, however, was an attempt to protect the
talent. The seven year limitation on personal services contracts was im-
posed as a direct response to the "star system" which had developed in
Hollywood in the 1920s and 1930s. The star system exploited young
talent by signing them to lengthy contracts at salaries that would prove
to be below market value as the performer gained public popularity.'o
This contractual limitation protects performers"° from the unequal bar-
gaining powers that exist between artist and record company. While ex-
clusive agreements with inequitable escalation clauses are still valid, the
law has at least released the artist from perpetual bondage."'
C. The Dual Nature of the Recording Agreement
Unlike most other industries, the entertainment industry is primar-
ily based on the "unique, intangible, and highly subjective talents of an
individual performer or artist.""' An exclusive recording agreement be-
tween a band and a record company constitutes a personal services con-
tract for which special rules of law apply. "1 2 Personal services contracts
present a problem under the Bankruptcy Code because these contracts
are often simultaneously executory contracts. While the Bankruptcy
Code gives the trustee in bankruptcy the power to determine the fate of
an executory contract,' 13 not all executory contracts are within the
trustee's power to assume, assign or reject.' Historically, courts" 5
have held that the trustee has no interest in personal services contracts"
16
because the services under these agreements cannot be performed by a
third party. I "
Because a recording agreement is an intimate personal services con-
tract between the group and the record company, it is useless for a
trustee to take title to such a contract."" The trustee cannot fulfill the
band's obligations under the contract either by assuming the contract
and performing it himself, or by assigning the recording agreement to
another band. Based on the multi-option feature of exclusive recording
108. BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BUSINESS, supra note 80, at 20.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 207.
112. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (Deering 1976).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1987).
114. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.05 (15th ed. 1979).
115. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Holahan, 311 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1962).
116. Id at 902.
117. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03 (15th ed. 1979).
118. Ford, 311 F.2d at 901.
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agreements, when the performer files bankruptcy, the recording agree-
ment is usually still executory and theoretically must still be performed.
Because of the duality of the contracts and the conflicting desires of
the parties involved, an ultimate determination of whether these con-
tracts should be rejectable means that record companies will be forced to
shoulder the risk of a band's insolvency.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
The Mankey" 9 decision is the result of strict statutory interpreta-
tion.12 ° The judicial analysis is technically correct, but the court's rigid
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code creates serious problems for Con-
crete Blonde, I.R.S., and for performer-debtors and record companies in
general. First, the Mankey decision contravenes the Bankruptcy Code
policies, and thus interferes with and undermines congressional intent.
Second, the decision that these contracts cannot be rejected forces the
performers to assume the contract and hence to work involuntarily, pos-
sibly in violation of constitutional protections.
A. Contravention of Bankruptcy Code Policies
The court's literal interpretation of sections 365 and 461 contra-
venes general Bankruptcy Code policies. Specifically, the Bankruptcy
Code policy is thwarted because nonrejection permits the record com-
pany to seek and enforce the negative injunction against the performer or
band members when the band refuses to assume the still valid recording
agreement.
The foundational policy behind the Bankruptcy Code is that debtors
can start over financially after surrendering their nonexempt property for
distribution to creditors. 2 ' This means giving the debtor a "new oppor-
tunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pres-
sure and discouragement of preexisting debt . . . 122 The fresh start
concept is given practical effect by the debtor's nonwaivable right of dis-
charge from his debts.' 23 The bankruptcy statutes have always inter-
preted "discharge" to mean "that an individual's human capital, (as
manifested in [the debtor's] future earnings), [is] freed of liabilities he [or
she] incurred in the past.' 24 The Bankruptcy Code codified this equita-
119. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5-6.
120. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 541 (1987).
121. Jackson, supra note 65, at 1393.
122. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
123. Jackson, supra note 65, at 1393.
124. Id. at 1396.
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ble policy in 11 U.S.C. section 541(a)(6), which specifically excludes a
debtor's future earnings from the definition of "property of the estate."125
As Professor Jackson 126 wrote, "[ilt is not surprising that bank-
ruptcy law has traditionally afforded distinctive protections to human
capital. Of the various forms of wealth, human capital is not only the
least diversifiable, but also has the most direct bearing on the future well-
being of the individual .... 127 In the instant case, the members of
Concrete Blonde emerged from their individual bankruptcies discharged
from their preexisting debts, yet all bearing the burden of the nonreject-
able exclusive recording agreement they had signed with I.R.S. 2 ' This
clearly deprived the performers of the "full scope of [their] dis-
charge[s],"' 129 effectively preventing the members of Concrete Blonde
from voluntarily practicing their chosen profession as recording
artists. 1
30
The Noonan '31 court considered what would happen if the record-
ing artist was compelled to assume the exclusive recording agreement he
had with the record company. 132 While the Noonan case did not deal
directly with the issue of whether a personal services contract can be
rejected in bankruptcy as did Mankey, the Noonan court clearly held that
a personal services contract is not part of the estate's property.
133
In Noonan, 134 the performer-debtor, Willie Nile, originally filed a
petition for a Chapter 11 reorganization. But when Nile realized that
Arista Records was prepared to fight 135 to keep him from rejecting his
125. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1987).
126. Thomas H. Jackson. Prof. Harvard. b. 1950. B.A., 1972 Williams Coll.; J.D., 1975
Yale. Yale L.J. Admitted NY, 1976; CA, 1979. Law Clerk, Judge M. Frankel, NY, 1975-76;
Law Clerk, Justice Rehnquist, DC, 1976-77; Ass't Prof., Stanford, 1977-80, Assoc. Prof.,
1980-82; Harvard, since 1986. Subjects: Commercial Law; Contracts; Creditors' Rights Cases,
Problems and Materials on Bankruptcy (with Baird), 1985; The Logic and Limits of Bank-
ruptcy Law, 1986; Cases, Problems and Materials on Security Interests in Personal Property
(with Baird), 2d ed. 1987. Member: Phi Beta Kappa. THE A.A.L.S. DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS 1987-88 at 445 (West).
127. Jackson, supra note 65, at 1432.
128. Mankey, supra note 10, at 5-6.
129. Matter of Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd memr. 697 F.2d
294 (2d Cir. 1982). "Discharge, the doctrine that frees the debtor's future income from the
chains of previous debts, lies at the heart of the bankruptcy policy." Jackson, supra note 65, at
1393.
130. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Rushakoff, Mankey, Napolitano v. International Rec-
ord Syndicate, Inc., Ch. 7 Case No. LA 87-18211-GM (1988).
131. 17 Bankr. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
132. Id. at 800.
133. Id. at 797. See also In re Tia Carrere, 64 Bankr. 156, 159 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
134. Matter of Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
135. Id at 795.
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recording agreement with the company, Nile converted' 36 from a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization case to a liquidation case 1 37 under Chapter 7, and
acknowledged that he wanted to benefit from the automatic rejection fea-
ture of section 365(d)(1).' 38 To avert rejection, Arista suggested a plan
to the court that allegedly benefited all of Noonan's creditors, and re-
quired Noonan to assume his recording agreement with Arista.1
39
The Noonan court inferred from the language of section 365(d)(I)
that although the trustee did not take title to the personal services con-
tract,14° the contract could still be rejected under the statute.' 4' The
court failed to see that, technically, if the performer's recording contract
could not become property of the estate, the rejection provision of section
365(d)(1) could not affect the contract. However, the Noonan court gave
credence and weight to congressional intent and reached its holding that
personal service contracts are rejectable by focusing on the essential
Bankruptcy Code policies.'
42
The Noonan court determined that if Nile could be compelled to
assume his recording agreement with Arista, the performer would leave
his bankruptcy subject to at least $300,000 of indebtedness. Arista could
recoup this indebtedness from future earnings.14 3 The Code's clear in-
tent to preserve all post-petition earnings solely for the benefit of the
debtor after the bankruptcy filing influenced the court.'" The Noonan
court's analysis implicitly followed the reasoning that though section 541
fails to specify whether rights under an executory personal services con-
tract come within the definition of "property of the estate," the absence is
a mere semantic oversight. 45 Because the statute specifically addresses
and excludes the post-bankruptcy fruits of such contracts, the court rea-
soned that the contract itself could be automatically rejected under the
Code. 146
However in Mankey, the conclusion that Concrete Blonde's record-
136. 11 U.S.C. § 706 (1987). This section confers on the debtor the right to convert his or
her bankruptcy case from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 proceeding. Id.
137. Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 795-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 796.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Noonan, 17 Bankr. at 800.
143. Id. at 800.
144. Id. at 797.
145. Appellee/Cross-Appellant International Record Syndicate Inc.'s Opening Brief at 13,
Rushakoff, Mankey, Napolitano v. International Record Syndicate, Inc., Ch. 7 Case No. LA
87-18211-GM (1988).
146. Noonan, 17 Bankr. at 796.
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ing contract with I.R.S. was not rejectable contradicts the rationale be-
hind Congress' explicit exclusion of future earnings from the bankruptcy
estate.'47 The United States Supreme Court commented that the broad
definition of "property of the estate" has limitations.14 8 The limitations
grow out of the Bankruptcy Code's competing policy of allowing the
bankrupt to accumulate future wealth which is free from creditors'
claims.'4 9 Furthermore, "[t]he right to a fresh start embodied in dis-
charge is not merely a matter of bankruptcy law, but rather a special
example of the increasingly common legal requirement that individuals
preserve a certain portion of their assets for the future."' 150
In Mankey the band members are precluded from preserving their
"human capital" for themselves post-bankruptcy. Additionally, the
court's holding potentially binds Concrete Blonde to its contract with
I.R.S. for an additional six years. This perverts the fresh start concept.
B. The Fresh Start Policy and the Negative Injunction
Outside the bankruptcy context, a breach of the agreements by the
band would probably entitle I.R.S. to a negative injunction.' 5 ' This equi-
table right to enjoin an artist from performing for others can be traced
directly back to Lumley v. Wagner,'52 a landmark English case decided
137 years ago which American courts have generally followed.' 3 In
Lumley, an opera singer contractually agreed to sing at plaintiff's theater
for a certain period of time. An express covenant contained in the agree-
ment barred the opera singer from singing anywhere else during the same
period.' 54 The plaintiff brought suit to prevent the opera singer from
performing for the plaintiff's competitor during the contract period."'
The chancellor in Lumley admitted that he could not specifically enforce
the entire contract, but he granted a negative injunction which restrained
147. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1987).
148. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
149. Id.
150. Jackson, supra note 65, at 1398 n. 15. "Bankruptcy discharge, accordingly, offers indi-
viduals only limited protection from the mistakes or misfortunes of the past. As such, it is part
of a wider range of programs, such as social security, through which society forces individuals
to provide for the future." Id.
151. 38 Cal. Jur. 3d Injunctions § 1 (1977). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 525 (Deering
1972).
152. 1 De G. M. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852); Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal
Services Contracts in the Entertainment Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18, 20 (1954) [hereinafter
Tannenbaum, Personal Services].
153. Tannenbaum, Personal Services, supra note 152, at 20.
154. Id. at 18.
155. Id at 19.
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the defendant singer from performing at the rival theater.' 56 The chan-
cellor said that "while he was not trying to do indirectly that which he
could not do directly ... if the injunction tended to cause the [singer] to
perform her contract with [the] plaintiff, so much the better."'
157
As with the opera singer's contract in Lumley, the exclusive record-
ing agreement signed by Concrete Blonde and I.R.S. included the major
provisions of the express negative covenant which insured the record
company Concrete Blonde's exclusive services during the contract pe-
riod.' 58 The major provisions of the express negative covenant included
a covenant under which the band members agreed to devote their serv-
ices exclusively to the record company, a covenant forbidding the mem-
bers from performing for another employer, a stipulation that the
services of the band were special and unique, and a stipulation that the
record company could seek injunctive relief to prevent breach of the con-
tract terms. 159
I.R.S. would have preferred the exclusive use of Concrete Blonde's
talents rather than the next best solution of preventing the band from
recording albums for another company. California courts will not order
specific performance of a personal services contract. However, these
courts have held that a breach of contract may be enjoined as long as the
following factors are proven:1 ° 1) The personal services contract must
be written, and must provide for minimum compensation to the em-
ployee at the statutory rate, 2) The contemplated services at issue in the
contract must be of that special and unique character that gives them
peculiar value, and the loss to the employer of these services cannot be
reasonably or adequately compensated 16 1 in damages.' 62 California
courts have added the caveat that, in order to grant a negative injunction,
the employer must prove that it will receive value beyond the possibility
that the band may be induced by the injunction to perform under the
agreement.163 In general, negative injunctions are granted by the courts
to eliminate unfair competition, and not to regulate the employee's ac-
ceptance of new employment.' 6'
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Motion of I.R.S. for Dismissal, supra note 31, at 11.
159. Id. at 19.
160. 38 Cal. Jur. 3d Injunctions § 526 (1977).
161. Id. An injunction may be granted when pecuniary compensation would not afford
adequate relief. Id.
162. 38 Cal. Jur. 3d Injunctions § 41 (1977).
163. Tannenbaum, Personal Services, supra note 152, at 20.
164. Id. at n.5.
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I.R.S. could persuade a court to enjoin Concrete Blonde, but the
bankruptcy context creates new concerns and requires a rebalancing of
competing policies and equities. A decision concerning the effect bank-
ruptcy should have on a personal services contract is required. The
debtor's fresh start after bankruptcy should be weighed more heavily
than the financial losses the record company will encounter, as well as
the additional risks that are created by rejectability. 65
In Savoy Record Co. v. Mercury Record Corp.,166 a singer named
Melvin Lightsey, known professionally as Mel Walker, was under an ex-
clusive contract to furnish personal services as a vocalist when he filed a
petition in bankruptcy. 167 Soon after the bankruptcy filing, Lightsey
signed a new recording agreement with Mercury Records.16 The dis-
trict court discharged the debtor from his debts, but found that the dis-
charge did not relieve Lightsey of his contract with Savoy Records. 169
Since the executory personal services contract was not discharged in
bankruptcy, Savoy obtained a preliminary injunction to prohibit Mer-
cury Records from the further manufacture and sale of recordings made
by Lightsey. 170 The Savoy rule' 7 ' states where a debtor files bankruptcy
to evade obligations under a personal services contract,172 he has not filed
as an honest but unfortunate debtor and is not entitled to be freed from
his indebtedness.
173
The Savoy court viewed the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act as pri-
marily to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution
among creditors. 17  While equality of distribution is a key bankruptcy
policy, the Savoy court did not consider Lightsey's right to a fresh start
in its decision. The Savoy holding nullified the beneficial effects the bank-
ruptcy discharge could have had on Lightsey's future.
As in Savoy, the court in Mankey also effectively eliminated the
fresh start sought by the members of Concrete Blonde. The Mankey
holding is akin to granting a negative injunction to I.R.S. The effect of a
nonrejectable contract is to compel the band to remain idle and deprived
165. As stated earlier, this article does not discuss the good faith/bad faith filing distinction.
166. 108 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.J. 1952).
167. Id. at 958.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 959.
170. Id. at 958.
171. Savoy, 108 F. Supp. 957, 959. See also In re Tia Carrere, 64 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1986), and In re Southern California Sound Systems, Inc., 69 Bankr. 893 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1987).
172. Savoy, 108 F. Supp. at 958.
173. Id. at 959.
174. Id at 958-59.
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of its earning power, or to perform for I.R.S. Outside of bankruptcy, and
even where the nonbreaching party has a right to the remedy, courts
have shown a disinclination to enforce the negative covenant where the
effect would force the breaching party to choose between remaining idle
and deprived of earning capacity or working against his or her will.'75
C. The Constitutional Problem Caused by Nonrejection
The proscriptions against involuntary servitude are still paramount
to Americans. The intention to prevent forced labor remains as vital to-
day as when the thirteenth amendment was added to the Constitution.1
76
Congress was aware that the prohibition against involuntary servitude
loomed large in bankruptcy. 77 To insure that debtors are not enslaved
by their creditors, Congress prohibits involuntary Chapter 13 cases
78
where the individual with a regular income, who has generally not been
paying his or her debts, 1 79 is forced into laboring for his creditors. Con-
gress believes that financial slavery strips the debtor of all that makes life
worth living. 1
80
Theoretically, while nonrejectability of the contract is not the same
as explicitly forcing the band to assume the contract, both achieve the
same result. Realistically, survival of the contract post-bankruptcy
forces the band to assume the burdensome recording contract and per-
form under it for the duration of the contractual period.' 8'
As the court in Noonan 182 postulated, forcing assumption on Con-
crete Blonde means the members leave the bankruptcy process still in-
debted to I.R.S., which has the right to recoup its advances from the
band's second album. This contravenes the policy of leaving future earn-
ings to the debtor alone.'
83
VI. CONCLUSION
I.R.S. alleged that other record companies are interested in signing
Concrete Blonde. This industry interest in the acclaimed band is irrele-
vant because the contract between the band and I.R.S. is still effective.
Until the contract is terminated, Concrete Blonde cannot sign with a new
175. Tannenbaum, Personal Services, supra note 152, at 20.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
177. Matter of Noonan, 17 Bankr. 793, 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
178. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 706(c) and 1301 et seq. (1987).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1987).
180. Noonan, 17 Bankr. at 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
181. See generally Tannenbaum, Personal Services, supra note 152, at 18.
182. Noonan, 17 Bankr. at 793.
183. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1987).
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label. Thus, Concrete Blonde and I.R.S. remain intertwined with each
other.
A reversal of Mankey would guarantee Concrete Blonde and others
who are similarly situated their right to a fresh start in life. Executory
personal services contracts should be rejectable in bankruptcy as a gen-
eral rule. Certainly, a performer should not be able to misuse the bank-
ruptcy process, but methods could be created for barring rejection of the
contract if the bankruptcy petition was filed in bad faith. While
rejectability will injure record companies' interests, such a holding would
send a strong and loud message to all that these contracts must be en-
tered into with more care and ought to be more equitably drafted from
the start.
Rejectability will force the companies to reduce the large dollar:
amounts of front end advances to young bands. The companies will no
longer be able to rely on the contract's inviolability in bankruptcy. Since
"[a] keystone to the entertainment industries has been the ability to
thwart a star from walking,"' 84 allowing the rejection of personal serv-
ices contracts will shift some power from the record companies to the
performers. While the continued vitality of the contract after the bank-
ruptcy discharge could encourage the renegotiation of contracts between
performers and record companies, the existing balance of powers sug-
gests that such renegotiation is not a realistic expectation. So long as
Mankey is followed, record companies need not engage in renegotiation
because they know the contracts are indestructible even from the per-
formers' bankruptcy.
Thus, rejection of these contracts will level the playing field. At
first, the ability of untested talent to get a recording contract may be
more difficult, but as advances are reduced the record companies will
actually be able to sign more performers to contracts and spread the risks
over a greater number of performers and bands. Reduced advances not
only protect the record companies from future bankruptcy-induced
losses, but also protect both companies and performers by decreasing the
likelihood that the performers will become insolvent through overindul-
gence in the high life before there are profits. Reversing Mankey will
send a signal to entertainment executives that it is time to stop proceed-
ing in creative ventures on the twin elements of miscalculation and
overextension.' 85
The Bankruptcy Code policies have been frustrated by the decision
184. BIEDERMAN, LAW AND BUSINESS, supra note 80, at 46.
185. Id. at 91.
1989]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
in Mankey 18 6 because the debtors' fresh start has been severely impaired.
The Noonan court stated "[a]s the full measure of a debtor's fresh start
flowing from the bankruptcy is vital to Congress' mission in enacting the
Code, anything which would frustrate the mission must be scrutinized
carefully." 18 7 The Noonan court decision should be followed.
Cherise M Wolas
186. See generally Mankey, supra note 10.
187. Noonan, 17 Bankr. at 800.
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